Op-ed in The Hill: All Americans lose with partisan attacks on the electoral process

This op-ed originally appeared in The Hill on November 12, 2019.

In close elections, the playbook for losing candidates is well worn. They blame the voting process, undermine confidence in election results, and delegitimize the opposition. Both parties do it, and all Americans lose in the end. Political actors are incentivized to attack the legitimacy of the voting process. Take the gubernatorial race in Kentucky. Republican Governor Matt Bevin trails Democratic Attorney General Andy Beshear, though it appears he is behind by an insurmountable margin. Bevin has every right under state law to request a recount to ensure the validity of the result. But instead of saying just that, he added an almost reflexive nod toward fraud by claiming undefined and unreported “irregularities.”

The intent is clear to make the process or other nefarious action be the reason he lost. Those who voted for Bevin will hear that message. In our era of hyperpolarization, it means that they will claim that the likely winner is illegitimate. Whatever Beshear does during his term can thus be easily written off as unfair or even illegal. Neither party is alone in undermining confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral process. Kentucky also saw a rather unusual “call” of the election for Beshear by Democratic Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes very shortly after polls closed and before the Associated Press made its traditional announcement of a winner. Calling results like this is not the job of any election official.

Election administrators at the local level are the front line for reporting results. They coordinate a logistical masterpiece whereby results from all the polling places under their control must be delivered, tallied, and reported as unofficial to the public. State officials to varying degrees aggregate these unofficial results and report them for statewide races. The state will certify the result as final in the weeks after Election Day.

Election night results are unofficial for a reason. First, it is the culmination of a long day. When votes are tallied in the precinct, tired poll workers are known to make transcription errors, which will be discovered later in the canvassing process. Second, every state permits some amount of voting by mail, and many states do not report those results right away. Finally, any provisional ballots cast on Election Day must be adjudicated.

A Democratic secretary of state who makes an election “call” during the initial and unofficial reporting of results in an extremely close race will unnecessarily poison the well when you consider her office will play a role in a recount or challenge. Why should voters, particularly those who are now primed to view the election results as illegitimate by their preferred candidate, believe that the recount can be done without bias?

Attacks on the system are now commonplace. Republicans tend to claim voter fraud, and Democrats cry voter suppression no matter the action taken. The truth is rarely so black and white. The Bipartisan Policy Center and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has released a report on polling place lines in 2018. The study spanned more than 3,100 precincts, 211 jurisdictions, and 11 states, accounting for 10.5 million votes cast, or about 9 percent of national turnout in the midterm elections. Jurisdiction size ranged from Metz Township in Michigan with 230 registered voters to San Diego County in California with nearly 3 million registered voters.

The good news is that in the 2018 midterm elections, the average voting wait time was just under 9 minutes, well within the acceptable 30 minute limit that is set by the bipartisan Presidential Commission on Election Administration in 2014. The bad news is that nearly 5 percent of precincts averaged more than 30 minute wait times throughout Election Day. We found that the distribution of those very lengthy wait times is uneven. Precincts with a high portion of minority voters saw significantly longer wait times. In precincts with 10 percent or less minority voters, the average wait time was 5 minutes. In precincts with 90 percent or more minority voters, the average wait climbed to more than 32 minutes.

Some might use this data as proof that local election administrators are intent on suppressing turnout in some areas. But many factors contribute to long lines, and the administrators, mostly civil servants, tend to be focused on improving voter experience at the polls. More likely, these areas have been hampered by state and local policy decisions that limit investment in modernizing polling places with better technology and make it difficult to allocate resources to meet uneven demand.

It will take a lot of internal reflection and some difficult work on behalf of political actors, administrators, and the voters themselves to understand and value the importance of election legitimacy. We are all too cynical about the process and assume the worst. Instead, we must all allow the voting process to unfold as intended by state and federal law and believe that the electoral process in this country is worthy of our trust.

The 2020 Election is One Year Away. Here’s What You Need to Know About Election Security

This post was originally on the BPC blog co-authored by Timothy Harper

Americans learned after the 2016 election that our electoral process was not as secure as imagined. We may not know all the threats and tactics our adversaries will use during the 2020 cycle, but the country is miles ahead when it comes to repelling them.

Foreign adversaries in 2016 sought to sow distrust in democracy, exposing many weaknesses in our election system. Maybe the most glaring vulnerability in our system was an attribute of American elections that most thought to be a feature, not a bug: the decentralized nature of the voting process.

American elections are largely run by over 8,000 local administrators with varying levels of resources to defend against nation state actors. The local administrators and states in 2016 were left to defend themselves even when they were unaware in real-time about attempted cyberattacks happening across the country. This framework of defense is untenable. After all, we would never expect a solitary township in Michigan to defend itself against a military ground invasion from a foreign government, yet this is what local election offices were up against in the cyber realm.

Getting officials at the local, state, and federal level to work toward the same goal isn’t always easy, but it’s a real success story when it comes to U.S. elections after 2016. Officials in every state and territory, regardless of partisanship, have been working to protect and defend against cyber and other security threats to the 2020 presidential election. This time around, they have more resources than ever before. The Department of Homeland Security in 2017 designated elections as critical infrastructure. This designation led DHS to prioritize security assistance to state and local jurisdictions, enhance information sharing about security threats, and establish formal coordination mechanisms.

The critical infrastructure designation initially sparked bipartisan condemnation from states concerned about the expanding federal role in elections—a state prerogative. DHS responded by investing in building relationships and listening to election officials’ concerns and has now established itself as a key resource for state and local governments when it comes to providing resources, training, and monitoring. This monitoring will prove helpful in 2020.

For example, while foreign actors in 2016 were probing voter registration systems in all 50 states, information about these threats was not being shared effectively because there was no mechanism to do so. In fact, we learned from reporting that federal law enforcement officials were in contact with some state officials about attempted cyberattacks, but oftentimes they were not talking to the state personnel responsible for the voting process. DHS has since created the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or EI-ISAC, to allow election jurisdictions to share information about threats in real-time. All 50 states and nearly 2,000 local election officers are members.

Despite these important improvements, it remains a long-term concern that the critical infrastructure designation could be rescinded at any time. Whereas other critical infrastructure designations are established in law, the elections designation was made at the secretary level. That’s why we believe Congress should codify the designation in statute. We worry that a different DHS secretary with other funding priorities could leave the elections community without a strong federal partner in election security considering how little funding the U.S. Election Assistance Commission receives.

Funding for election security to the states is another concern. States and locals need more funding—and more consistent funding—to secure elections. The $380 million in election security grants appropriated in 2018 were the first federal appropriation to states for election administration since 2010 and, while the money was useful, for some states it translated to just $3 million. Elections have swelled into complex logistical and IT operations in the last two decades and require consistent state and federal investment commensurate with their scale.

There is still time for any additional funding appropriated by state and federal legislators to be put to good use in advance of 2020. These include upgrading voter registration databases, implementing two-factor authentication and other firewalls, and investing in cybersecurity training programs and contingency planning exercises for local administrators. Some small election jurisdictions need assistance just getting to a basic level of cybersecurity preparation.

One risk that probably cannot be addressed before 2020 is the voting machines in the polling places. There are still some states using voting technology tested to standards created before the original iPhone was released. Some of these systems also lack a paper record and upgrading to modern systems that use robust and auditable paper ballots is an important priority. Due to long timelines for purchasing and implementation, it is unlikely any money appropriated in late 2019 or 2020 will lead to voters seeing new machines on Election Day.

Elections are more secure than ever. Resources and relationships matter. Election officials at the state and local level with the help of federal partners are working together on the most impactful solutions in the near-term while also planning for the long-term. With a year to go, policymakers should do everything they can to help election officials build on their successes to create the 21st century election process about which all Americans can be proud.

Clean 2019 Elections Jumpstart A Year of Voting in 2020

This post was originally on the BPC blog.

The off-year election results will be dissected by analysts for cues about what it portends for the next year of campaigning. I’m more interested about what it means for administering good elections and ensuring the legitimacy of the process.  

No election is perfect. Throughout the country, there were reports about voting technology not working correctly, pens for marking ballots without ink, voters receiving the wrong ballots, and results websites going down. These are issues that no election administrator ever wants to see happen to their voters. But they happen, and those same administrators have every incentive to rectify the issues as quickly as possible.  

Even when officials can point to the source of the problem and its solution, candidates affected by those races have been quick to cry foul and “fraud” with no evidence, which serves to undermine confidence in the legitimacy of the outcome. There will be many more opportunities during the 2020 primaries and general election for candidates to attack the process—often without any tangible proof—to further their positions when they perceive they may be on the losing end of a contest.  

But these baseless threats to election legitimacy damage the process and weaken our governing institutions. Elected officials, administrators, candidates, and even the press must be hyperaware of how their comments impact the voting experience. 

For the most part, overnight reporting on the 2019 election did not reveal many accusations of nefarious activities. It is worth it, however, to point out two examples to show how candidates and officials can unnecessarily undermine confidence during the election process with just a few statements.  

Kentucky’s gubernatorial election is incredibly close. In fact, the various news agencies that typically declare winners based on statistical models have not yet made a call on the outcome. The process for recounts and contests in Kentucky is fairly clear. The losing candidate can request a recanvass of the vote, followed by a full recount.  

Why then did Governor Bevins, who is currently trailing in the vote count decide to cite otherwise unsubstantiated “irregularities” as the reason for his decision not to concede the election?  

He has every right to not concede and to follow the process as defined by state law and could have framed his hesitation that way. But the feint to fraud is unnecessary and likely serves as a whistle to supporters to question the legitimacy of the election if he ultimately loses. 

Similarly, the American system of elections has developed in most states to position the secretary of state as the chief election official. That’s how it is in Kentucky. In this case, the Democratic secretary of state, Alison Lundergan Grimes, who is responsible for much of the elections process, decided to appear on live television while election returns were still being received by the counties and compiled by the state to declare that the Democratic nominee had won the gubernatorial election.  

I have had the privilege to know many secretaries of state. The idea that these officials “call” elections is just wrong and disappointing to see. Doing so while in her position will lead many to question the objectivity of her office in administering any recanvass or recount.  

However, most of what happened yesterday provides reason to cheer. Voter turnout exceeded expectations even where administrators were planning for higher than normal turnout. Voters even went to polling places when their jurisdictions were not having elections yesterday. 

Americans want to make their voices heard. It’s incumbent on those responsible for running a fair process and those battling for hearts and minds to remember that it all means nothing if the process is deemed illegitimate.

Now Is the Time to Fully Fund Election Assistance Commission

This post was originally posted to the BPC blog.

Elections are receiving more attention than ever. Record turnout during the 2018 midterms leads me to believe that the 2020 presidential cycle will see a huge increase in turnout over recent years. But that public interest in elections hasn’t carried over into funding for the federal agency tasked with improving elections. As the House and Senate work to resolve differences in their respective appropriations bills, Congress must find the will to fund the U.S. Election Assistance Commission at the level required to carry out its vital mission.

Congress created the EAC to serve as a national clearinghouse of information on election administration, test and certify voting equipment, conduct studies on elections in America, and administer grant funding to states. To fulfill these roles, the EAC requires staff, contractors, and an operating budget to bring policymakers, administrators, and experts together to improve election administration across the country.

The EAC received just $7.95 million in FY2019 for general operating support, which represents the lowest amount the Commission has received since its creation in 2004. The budget was 69% larger at the high-water mark for its operating funds in 2010. The threats to elections have grown in number and the complexity has exploded, but the EAC has not kept up.

Line chart of EAC appropriations from FY2005 until FY2019

Table of EAC appropriations from FY2005 until FY2019 in total and for operating expenses

A rough calculation of regular EAC expenses shows quite how quickly $7.95 million goes. The EAC must fund its Office of Inspector General ($1 million); the Election Administration and Voting Survey ($900,000); and the salaries and benefits of the six statutory employees, including four commissioners, executive director, and general counsel ($1.2 million). The remaining $5 million has to cover rent for office space, the disbursement and monitoring of federal election security grants, the voting system testing and certification program, the meetings of the EAC Board of Advisors, EAC Standards Board, and Technical Guidelines Development Committee as well as all other staff salaries. It’s not enough to do the job.

The Senate and House of Representatives are far apart on the appropriate level of funding for the EAC. The House-passed appropriations bill would provide the agency about $12.5 million in operating funds for 2020. The companion appropriations bill in the Senate would only provide about $8.1 million. Congress must get to the higher end of that range.

I concede that EAC has done itself no favors. The commission has been embroiled in litigation on different fronts and has been unable to update voting system guidelines in a substantial way since 2007. And it will likely enter 2020 without an executive director or general counsel, two positions that become vacant this week after the incumbents’ four-year terms expire.  The EAC’s clearinghouse function, which could add so much value to the field, has not yet performed as expected.

Yet, Congress has exacerbated the problems. Long vacancies on the commission have left the agency without a quorum for more than a quarter of its existence, including a nearly 10-year vacancy in one of the commissioner roles, and less than a third of the time have all four commissioner seats been filled. The level of funding over the past seven years makes it difficult to recruit and retain staff, who know they will be asked to serve in many different capacities.

A functioning and funded EAC would be a real value add for election officials:

• The turnover in local election administration is high. The EAC’s clearinghouse would supplement the efforts states make to train new election administrators quickly at a cost saving to the states.

• The EAC has a unique ability to view the entire election landscape across the country. The commissioners and staff should be sharing lessons learned from policy development and implementation in one state with policymakers and administrators in all the other states to improve the voting experience. The commission can also be a better resource for officials in the administration and Congress on the development of federal election policy.

• Election security is currently key priority of the Department of Homeland Security, which designated elections as critical infrastructure in 2017. Unlike other critical infrastructure designations, the elections designation was made at the secretary level and not in law. While DHS may be making efforts in 2019 and 2020 to connect federal resources to state and local administrators, future DHS secretaries with other priorities may do the same. The EAC is the only federal agency whose mission is to support election administration across the country.

• EAC’s data collection and analysis program helps administrators and policymakers understand the electorate in context. Additional focus on research that helps everyone understand U.S. election administration would lead to better policy development.

• Voting systems must be tested against rigorous standards. The manufacturers are ready to build state-of-the art voting systems once they have a clear understanding of federal standards coming from the EAC.

The EAC needs one more chance to prove its value to the field. It has a full complement of commissioners and national attention. Congress must provide the appropriate level of funding that allows the commission to perform its duties well.

Priorities for Congress in Appropriating Election Security Funding

This post was originally on the BPC blog

Any entity—individual, nonprofit, company, or government—that has Internet-connected processes must focus on cybersecurity. That is just the current reality. For too long, election administration has only been a focus when something goes spectacularly wrong, like chads not fully detaching from punch cards or non-recountable elections. Those that would disrupt elections today can do so from thousands of miles away and that threat has not diminished. In fact, it is always evolving and reinventing itself. To protect democracy requires a sustained effort by state and local officials with the financial support of the federal government.

Congress will be considering this fall additional grants to states to secure the voting process from outside interference. The needs from local election administrators on the front lines and state election officials are many, and Congress can do much to target future appropriations for maximum impact.

While a full public discussion of each policy consideration would help the public to more fully understand Congressional priorities, the main attention during the upcoming appropriations cycle should center on four main conversations:

1. How to prioritize the replacement of outdated technology with voting systems using robust and auditable paper ballots

2. Ways to get money to local election administrators

3. The appropriate balance between federal and state funding

4. Defining what success is

First, federal policy should support paper-based voting systems with robust and auditable paper trails and require rigorous pre- and post-election auditing of various aspects of the elections process. There is a provision in the House-passed fiscal year 2020 financial services appropriation bill, HR3351, that requires states to certify they are only using paper-based voting systems before federal grant money can be spent on other security upgrades. We believe that paper-based systems that allow for some sort of ballot marking device for voters with disabilities are the best option on the market today. BPC further encourages states to prioritize the replacement of older voting systems that do not produce auditable records.

However, restrictions like this one that prioritize the move to paper-based systems over all other security enhancements is an overly prescriptive requirement at this time that will have unintended consequences on the usefulness of federal election security grants ahead of 2020. In this case, it means that states would not be able to access grants to secure voter registration databases and hire additional IT staff, which are likely to have more immediate impacts on repelling foreign interference.

Second, Congress should ensure that federal funding is getting to the front-line election administrators. The equipment, policies, and processes that voters interact with when casting a ballot are administered locally. In too many states, election officials at the local level report that they have received none of their state’s share of the $380 million sent in 2018. This needs to change.

Congress can require that a percentage of the funding be passed through from states to local jurisdictions. However, the federal funding should not go directly to local jurisdictions. It is hard to conceive of an effective program that requires the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which administers federal election security grants, to work with thousands of local election jurisdictions. Some of those jurisdictions are incredibly small and would have a difficult time complying with the numerous requirements that come with federal dollars.

Local officials could use the money to address vulnerabilities such as:

• IT and cybersecurity limitations

• Physical security of election equipment

• Auditing the elections process

• Hiring security-focused staff

While effective investments have been made federally and at the state-level over the past two years, it is time to create a structure that increases the chance that the front-line election administrators have what they need to run a secure election.

Third, any discussion of additional federal funding for elections should include a look at the states’ share of the investment. Election improvement grants to date have come with a mandatory 5% match by the states, and it is not unreasonable to consider an increase in the match from states to access the federal funds. State and local policymakers are usually eager to access federal funds to improve election security and are seeking larger appropriations and a more reliable long-term semi-regular funding mechanism. They need to step up as well. Moreover, states should not expect continued federal resources to cover all necessary capital upgrades. These cannot be the sole responsibility of the federal government.

Finally, policymakers from both parties and at all levels of government must together define what “success” means for federal election security grants. Too many have argued that a lack of overt interference in 2018 represents success that means further federal involvement is unnecessary.

Congress agrees that there was interference in the elections process in 2016. The recent Senate Intelligence Committee report about the efforts of foreign governments to infiltrate the election administration process is among the most in-depth and bipartisan examinations of the 2016 election. The federal government’s designation of elections as critical infrastructure in January 2017 and the work by the Department of Homeland Security since are relatively unknown success stories for how the federal government can work with states and localities on policy. Yet none of these successes means that the work is done or that the federal government’s role is diminished going forward.

In the context of election security grants, success could be shown through

• The number of jurisdictions brought up to a baseline IT infrastructure, participating in cybersecurity trainings, and implementing cybersecurity best practices.

• The number jurisdictions using the money to purchase and roll out voting systems with auditable paper and performing audits.

• A new metric on intergovernmental coordination to secure elections that builds a bipartisan, united front about the fundamental need to protect our democratic ideals from outside influence.

Congress can come together this fall to take a step forward in securing our elections. It means stepping away from some well-worn talking points and working in the areas where common ground can be achieved. This fall’s process to fund the federal government may one day be looked at as the beginning of a coherent national strategy on elections. I hope it is.

Congress Should Secure Elections for the Long-Term

This post was originally on the BPC blog.

Congress still has time to address multiple weaknesses in how we secure our elections before 2020 and for the long-term. It requires rising above thorny partisan disputes and agreeing to a set of shared values and goals for the election process. It also means settling on at least a minimal role the federal government can play in elections.  This may seem a tall order in today’s political environment, but I have reason to think there is a window for success during the funding battles to come this fall.

A unified Republican Congress in early 2018 appropriated $380 million to secure the voting process representing the largest appropriation of federal funding to states for elections since the initial outlays under the Help America Vote Act in 2002. Those federal resources were rushed to states to combat rising cybersecurity concerns that emerged from the 2016 presidential election. Congress aimed to make a positive impact on the 2018 cycle.

The 2018 cycle did not generate the worrisome headlines we saw in 2016, but that may not be directly attributable to the 2018 congressional appropriation. In fact, much of that money was not spent before Americans cast their ballots during the midterms last year. It is projected that states will still have a small percentage of the 2018 grants remaining after the 2020 election, and all the money must be spent by early 2023.

Despite some remaining funds from a significant one-time investment, states will need much more funding with reliability over the long-term in addition to a robust partnership with their federal and local partners to secure our elections processes in the ways American expect.

Where Do Federal Resources Make the Biggest Impact?

Congress determines the acceptable uses for federal election funding. These expenditures should reflect a bipartisan understanding of the most basic role of the federal government in elections: election security.

And that is where states have spent the money so far. In the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s annual report to Congress about the spending of election grants to states, states reported plans to spend the funding to replace outdated voting technology, to conduct external security analyses, to upgrade voter registration databases, and to harden physical security among many other strategies.

The level of funding in most cases allows states to begin making these needed investments, but the vulnerabilities and needs are far greater than existing funding allows and will require regular expenditures over several funding cycles. Any technology purchased in part with federal funding will require frequent upgrading of software and hardware on more reasonable timelines than election officials have made them in the past.

Federal funding incentivizes states to make investments in their elections processes. The money Congress sent to states must be matched at 5% with state funds, which is a small way of ensuring the states have “skin in the game.” The availability of federal funding also adds political pressure on states for policymakers to focus resources on their elections systems; no policymaker wants to leave federal funding on the table when it comes to securing democracy. That’s good for each state’s voters because they will be participating in a more secure election process, but it also improves overall confidence in the U.S. voting process because voters know that election security is a priority everywhere.

Still, specific voter-facing election policy is best made at the state and local level where legislators can select policies that reflect historical decisions, current electorate preferences, and the interaction between new laws with other intertwined parts of the process.

The federal role revolves around election policy is—at minimum—one that focuses on the legitimacy and security of the voting process. With American elections under attack from foreign adversaries, states cannot all successfully defend themselves without the full backing of the United States government. They need the robust partnership to avoid further activities that only serve to delegitimize our elections.

That is why states need to continue spending existing and future federal grants on those investments most immediately focused on securing the elections process and most in line with Congressional intent. States should:

• Upgrade the hardware and security of state voter registration databases, which serve as the basis of many other election administration functions.

• Secure voting systems that include durable paper ballots that are counted on separate machines than those used to mark the ballot.

• Revamp the basic IT infrastructure of elections offices. The largest election jurisdictions have significant IT teams. The smallest offices have no IT staff and are often included on the county’s servers with no firewalls. Any attacks affecting the county could take the election office offline.

• Move all jurisdictions to “.gov” websites and email servers, which would ensure voters know that they are interacting with the trusted sources of information.

• Schedule the whole suite of cybersecurity training for all election administrators at every level and implement multifactor authentication at least to the most vulnerable databases.

• Develop a program of cyber navigators that seeks to connect election officials with appropriate resources would be highly effective and in need of further expansion and elevate an individual in state election offices with the role of keeping all jurisdictions in the state aware of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.

There are many other areas where Congress could improve the voting experience for all Americans. Admittedly there are a larger number of ideological differences in those areas. But Congress cannot let a lack of consensus on other areas of election policy derail their responsibility today to assist states and local officials to secure American democracy.

C-SPAN Washington Journal Appearance

On September 3, I was the featured guest on C-SPAN’s morning show, Washington Journal.

On Election Security, More Transparency Can Rebuild Voters’ Trust

Congress has finally held an all-members election security briefing by top Department of Homeland Security and federal law enforcement officials to learn about progress made since 2016 and threats to future elections. It was a valuable, if overly-delayed, first step for Congress to fully understand the vulnerabilities our democracy faces. But why was it all done in secret?

Elections are the foundation of American democracy, and they must be free, fair, secure, and accessible, for all eligible voters. They must also be as transparent as possible so that voters have confidence in the legitimacy of the process that the government has designed to elect the people’s representatives to that government.

Congress missed a rare opportunity to improve public confidence in election security.

There will always be a balance to strike between security and transparency when it comes to elections. Voters want to know that the system is free and fair, and election administrators will never share information about the process that could lead to exploitation by foreign actors. So how do we get to a secure and fair election?

Voter registration is one example of the balance between the security and transparency priorities. To secure the voting process, eligible citizens in all states—except North Dakota—must be registered to vote in order to receive and cast a ballot. Registering voters allows election officials to verify an individual’s eligibility, ensuring that each voter meets constitutional and state legal requirements to vote and only receives one ballot. For transparency, states then make the voter rolls—and in many cases the database of election history—accessible to the public. That way the public knows who is eligible to vote and for which races they can and did cast a ballot.

It is no different when it comes to the balance policymakers must strike to defend the election process from outside intrusion. No one expects states and counties to defend themselves alone against foreign attacks in any other context. A military attack on any one state by a foreign adversary would elicit a response from the United States military, not that one state’s National Guard. It should be no different for attacks on any state’s electoral process, which local and state election administrators have long had to defend by themselves.

The federal government has now identified a role for itself in securing American elections. First, DHS designated the elections process as critical infrastructure after the 2016 election. Then the states received a total of $380 million in federal grants in early 2018 for election security. It was the first substantial appropriation of new funding for election administration since the Help America Vote Act passed in 2002, although much of the money was disbursed to states too late to be spent before the 2018 election.

Because the federal government has a role in protection our elections process, the American public has a right, within reason, to know what it is doing. Unfortunately, the public rarely hears about the improvements made using federal grants, or where more funding is needed to ensure a free and fair process. No one is asking the government to divulge state secrets related to our defense posture. But the public has reasonable questions about election integrity and whether states are being responsible and efficient with the federal funds.

The facts are these: elections are more secure than ever, the federal funding has helped but much more is needed, and the public is mostly unaware of both the great progress made and remaining vulnerabilities.

Government at all levels must act quickly to rebuild Americans’ trust in the system, which has been shaken by recent events. Without action, we leave open a door for candidates of any political party to irresponsibly cast doubt on election results and further erode confidence in one of the central tenets of our democracy: the idea that our votes count.

Confidence in the legitimacy of the process requires a public discussion about the priorities we have for the election system, from accessibility to security, and how to best balance them. Congress is well-positioned to lead such a discussion. Instead, the House and Senate heard about election security behind closed doors. It was an unforced error when Congress could have easily included a public component to last week’s security briefing.